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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants are Bucks County Deputy Sheriffs whose 
responsibilities include transporting prisoners, providing 
courtroom security, and serving bench warrants and 
summonses. The deputies filed suit under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. SS 207, 216, to recover overtime 
pay for time spent off premises and waiting on-call. The 
deputies contend that the district court erred by concluding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise, Senior District Judge of the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey sitting by 
designation. 
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that they are not entitled to overtime compensation for time 
spent off premises and waiting on-call and by granting 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We will 
affirm. 
 
I. Facts 
 
The historical facts are not in dispute. On weekdays, 
most deputies are assigned to the 7:00 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. 
shift. Two deputies at a time rotate into the 3:00 p.m. - 
11:00 p.m shift. When assigned the second shift, the 
deputy is required to be on-call from 11:00 p.m- 7:00 a.m. 
and for twenty-four hours a day on Saturday and Sunday. 
Although there is no written department policy regarding a 
deputy's obligations while on-call, a deputy is not required 
to remain at the sheriff 's office or stay in uniform. The 
deputy must carry a pager if not at home, and if paged, 
must report to work within a reasonable time. The deputies' 
employment terms are subject to a collective bargaining 
agreement between the county and AFSCME District 
Council 88. The agreement is not material to our decision. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
A district court's grant of summary judgment is subject 
to plenary review. Public Interest Research of N.J. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
The district court concluded that the deputies' on-call 
time was not compensable because it did not limit their 
personal activities to such a degree that their time was 
spent primarily for the county's benefit. The district court 
record shows that during the on-call time, the deputies 
were able to engage in personal activities, and although 
their activities were somewhat limited by their on-call 
status, the limits did not justify compensation. 
 
The deputies make three arguments for reversal. First, 
they claim that this matter was not appropriately decided 
by summary judgment, noting that whether acts are 
compensable is a fact-intensive inquiry. Next, they argue 
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that the district court erred by concluding that their 
personal activities were not limited enough to require 
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Finally, 
the deputies contend that the collective bargaining 
agreement should not be considered by the district court 
because they have been dissatisfied with their bargaining 
representative, and as a result most of the deputies are not 
dues-paying union members. 
 
A. 
 
Regarding the appellants' first argument, it is true that 
the issue of how a plaintiff spends his on-call time is one 
of fact and, therefore, cannot be resolved on summary 
judgment. Icicle Seafood, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 
714, 106 S. Ct. 1527, 1530 (1986). However, once there is 
no genuine issue of material fact as to how a plaintiff 
spends his on-call time, the determination of whether a 
plaintiff 's activities exclude him "from the overtime benefits 
of the FLSA is a question of law," which can properly be 
resolved on summary judgment. See, e.g., Renfro v. City of 
Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1536 (10th Cir. 1991) (relying on 
undisputed facts to grant summary judgment); Berry v. 
County of Sonoma, 30 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(Whether "limitations on the employees' personal activities 
while on-call are such that on-call waiting time would be 
considered compensable overtime under the FLSA is a 
question of law."). 
 
B. 
 
Turning to the deputies' second argument, there is no 
dispute regarding how the deputies spent their on-call time. 
Nonetheless, the deputies argue that the district court did 
not construe the evidence in their favor, as required by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The deputies' arguments 
focus on the district court's application of the undisputed 
facts to the test for compensability set forth by the 
Department of Labor and other Courts of Appeals. The 
deputies contend that the district court reached the 
incorrect conclusion based on these facts. 
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We are not persuaded. Simply because the issue before 
the court is fact-sensitive does not mean that once 
historical facts are undisputed, the court cannot reach a 
conclusion based on those facts. Where there is no dispute 
as to the historical facts, and the facts do not support the 
contention that on-call time is working time, the court may 
properly grant a motion for summary judgment. Bright v. 
Houston Northwest Medical Center, 934 F.2d 671, 675 (5th 
Cir. 1991) (en banc). 
 
The Fair Labor Standards Act does not dictate whether 
time spent waiting on-call, as opposed to time responding 
to a call, is compensable. In companion cases, the Supreme 
Court determined that on-call time can be compensable 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act, but declined to 
establish a bright line rule for compensability. See 
Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 65 S. Ct. 161 (1944); 
Armour & Co. v. Wanteck, 323 U.S. 126, 65 S. Ct. 165 
(1944). The Court held that "whether time is spent 
predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the 
employee's is a question dependent upon all the 
circumstances of the case." Armour, 323 U.S. at 133. 
 
The Department of Labor promulgated regulations stating 
that on-call time is compensable if the employee is required 
to remain on premises, or if the employee, although not 
required to remain on the employer's premises, finds his 
time on-call away from the employer's premises is so 
restricted that it interferes with personal pursuits. 29 
C.F.R. S 553.221(c), (d). The Department of Labor's 
regulation of the Fair Labor Standards Act is entitled to 
substantial deference. Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center for 
Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 1995); See also 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40, 65 S. Ct. at 164; Ford Motor 
Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555-56, 100 S. Ct. 790, 792 
(1980). The pertinent portions of the regulation are as 
follows: 
 
       "(c) Time spent away from the employer's premises 
       under conditions that are so circumscribed that they 
       restrict the employee from effectively using the time for 
       personal pursuits also constitutes compensable hours 
       of work. For example, where a police station must be 
       evacuated because of an electrical failure and the 
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       employees are expected to remain in the vicinity and 
       return to work after the emergency has passed, the 
       entire time spent away from the premises is 
       compensable. The employees in this example cannot 
       use the time for their personal pursuits. 
 
       (d) An employee who is not required to remain on the 
       employer's premises but is merely required to leave 
       word at home or with company officials where he or 
       she may be reached is not working while on call. Time 
       spent at home on call may or may not be compensable 
       depending on whether the restrictions placed on the 
       employee preclude using the time for personal 
       pursuits. Where, for example, a firefighter has returned 
       home after the shift, with the understanding that he or 
       she is expected to return to work in the event of the 
       emergency in the night, such time spent at home is 
       normally not compensable. On the other hand, where 
       the conditions placed on the employee's activities are 
       so restrictive that the employee cannot use the time 
       effectively for personal pursuits, such time spent on 
       call is compensable." 
 
29 C.F.R. S553.221 (c), (d). 
 
We have not considered the issue of whether time spent 
waiting on-call is compensable under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. The resolution of this issue is fact-specific, 
but there is no conflict among the Courts of Appeals 
dealing with this specific issue. The Courts have used 
various factors to weigh the level of interference with the 
employee's private life. See, e.g., Berry v. Sonoma County, 
30 F.3d 1174, 1183 (9th Cir. 1994) (seven factor analysis). 
Four factors are significant to our consideration:first, 
whether the employee may carry a beeper or leave home; 
second, the frequency of calls and the nature of the 
employer's demands; third, the employee's ability to 
maintain a flexible on-call schedule and switch on-call 
shifts; and fourth, whether the employee actually engaged 
in personal activities during on-call time. If these factors 
reveal onerous on-call policies and significant interference 
with the employee's personal life, Courts have held that on- 
call time is compensable. We cannot conclude that the 
deputies' activities here are restricted to such a degree. 
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First, the deputies may carry a beeper or leave word 
where they may be reached. The employee park rangers in 
Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Commission, were required to 
monitor a hand held radio at all times. 938 F.2d 912 (8th 
Cir. 1991). The radio had limited range, and because the 
employees were required to constantly monitor a hand 
radio, the Court determined that the on-call time 
significantly interfered with their private activities. The 
Court concluded that in that situation, the on-call time was 
compensable. In contrast, the turnpike employees in Martin 
v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 968 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1992), 
were on-call to respond to accidents or severe weather that 
interfered with traffic on the turnpike. When on call, 
employees could wear a beeper or leave word where they 
could be located. The Sixth Circuit held that on-call time 
was not compensable because the turnpike employees' 
freedom was not severely restricted by burdensome on-call 
policies. The deputies here have the same freedom of 
movement as the turnpike employees in Martin because 
they can carry a beeper, and are not, like the employees in 
Cross, required to monitor a radio. 
 
Second, the frequency and urgency of calls to the 
deputies do not preclude using their time for personal 
pursuits. In Renfro v. City of Emporia, 948 F.2d 1529, 1537 
(10th Cir. 1991), the Court determined that the on-call time 
was compensable because the frequency of calls 
significantly restricted personal schedule to the benefit of 
the employer. The firefighters in Renfro, although not 
required to remain on the premises while on call, were 
required to report within twenty minutes of a call and were 
called an average of three to five times a day. In contrast, 
employees who are called to duty less frequently, with a 
longer response time, can pursue personal activities with 
minimal interference, and Courts have held that they 
should not be compensated for on-call time under the 
FLSA. See Gilligan v. City of Emporia, 986 F.2d 410, 412 
(10th Cir. 1993) (employees called back less often than 
once a day, and were given thirty minutes to one hour to 
respond); Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430, 432 
(10th Cir. 1992) (police detectives called in on average less 
than two times a week and were able to report to duty 
within twenty minutes of responding to the page); Bright v. 
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Houston Northwest Medical Center, 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 
1991) (en banc) (biomedical equipment repair technician 
called an average frequency of two times per week and two 
to three times over the weekend required to report to the 
hospital within twenty minutes of being paged.) 
 
The deputies were not able to demonstrate that the 
frequency of calls approached three to five calls to duty per 
day like Renfro. Furthermore, even if the deputies had 
created an issue regarding the frequency of calls, the 
nature of duties such as prisoner transportation is not 
comparable to the demands imposed upon the employees in 
Cross and Renfro. The deputies are not required to report to 
the sheriff's office in a fixed amount of time. Several 
deputies testified that they have taken between 15 and 45 
minutes before leaving home in response to a call, and no 
deputy has been officially disciplined for responding late. 
Under these circumstances, we agree with the district court 
that the on-call policy was not overly restrictive with regard 
to response time. 
 
Third, the deputies ability to trade on-call shifts allowed 
them to effectively use their time for personal pursuits. The 
Court in Norton v. Worthen Van Services, Inc., 839 F.2d 
653, 654-56 (10th Cir. 1988) held that on-call time was not 
compensable, even though employees were subject to 
disciplinary action if they failed to respond withinfifteen to 
twenty minutes of a call, because employees could go 
"unavailable" and maintain flexibility in their personal time. 
In Renfro, on the other hand, shift trades were difficult, if 
not impossible, to arrange, and the firefighters were subject 
to discipline if they either failed to answer a call-back or 
were late, and on-call time was compensable. Renfro, 948 
F.2d at 1537. Here, the undisputed facts show that the 
deputies could trade shifts to pursue personal activities 
without interference. 
 
Finally, the record reveals that the deputies have been 
able to participate in personal activities while on-call. A 
number of deputies testified that they engaged in such 
activities as reading, watching television, doing housework, 
shopping, gardening and playing with their children. 
Moreover, some deputies have been able to attend little 
league games, visit family and friends, and attend religious 
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services. We recognize that these activities may not 
represent the full range of activities in which the deputies 
would like to engage. However, we agree with the Fifth 
Circuit that the test is not whether the employee has 
"substantially the same flexibility or freedom as he would if 
not on call, else all or almost all on-call time would be 
working time, a proposition that settled case law and the 
administrative guidelines clearly reject." Bright, 934 F.2d at 
677. See also Berry, 30 F.3d at 1185 ("The inquiry . . . is 
not whether the [plaintiffs] are prevented from participating 
in certain personal activities, but whether they actually 
engage in personal activities during on-call shifts."). Since 
the deputies were able to engage in numerous personal 
activities while on-call, this factor weighs in favor of finding 
the time non-compensable. 
 
C. 
 
The deputies' final argument is that the district court 
improperly considered the terms of their collective 
bargaining agreement to conclude that on-call time was 
compensable, and argue that under McGrath v. City of 
Philadelphia, 864 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Pa. 1994), they cannot 
bargain away legally guaranteed compensation under the 
FLSA. 
 
We need not reach this issue for two reasons. First, 
because we have determined that compensation is not 
required under the FLSA, the collective bargaining 
representative did not bargain away something guaranteed 
by the FLSA. Second, the district court specifically noted 
that its consideration of this issue was not dispositive. 
Instead, it stated that other Courts had considered 
employee acquiescence to uncompensated on-call time as a 
factor for consideration. See, e.g., Berry v. Sonoma County, 
30 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In sum, and for the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
summary judgment granted defendants and conclude that 
the County did not violate the FLSA. 
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